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The extent to which consumers are aware of available financial assets depends on the incentives of asset 
suppliers to spread information about the instruments they issue. We propose a theoretical framework in which 
the amount of information disseminated and the probability of individuals becoming aware of financial assets are 
correlated with the probability that, once informed, they will invest in the asset and negatively affected by the 
cost of spreading information. Social learning is a further channel through which potential investors may come to 
be informed about existing assets. While social learning may limit the production of financial information by 
assets suppliers, it increases the probability that individuals become financially aware. These predictions are 
supported by data on awareness of financial assets available in the 1995 and 1998 waves of the Italian Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth. Lack of financial awareness has important implications for understanding the 
stockholding puzzle and for estimating stock market participation costs. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The classical theory of portfolio choice rests on strong assumptions: no transaction 
costs, investors’ awareness of the full menu of assets available and knowledge of their risk 
and return, no uninsurable risks, such as human capital. If all investors face the same 
distribution of returns and have the same information set, in equilibrium they select the same 
menu of risky assets. Differences in attitudes to risk affect the allocation of wealth between 
safe and risky assets, but not the particular asset selected. And if the utility function has 
constant relative risk aversion, asset shares are independent of wealth. Under these 
assumptions, the rich man’s portfolio is simply a scaled-up version of that of poor man’s. 
However recent empirical studies have shown that household portfolios exhibit far too 
much heterogeneity to be consistent with this sort of uniformity. In particular, many 
individuals simply do not invest in stocks, a feature that has come to be known as the 
stockholding puzzle. 
Fixed entry costs have been the main thesis in the literature to resolve the puzzle. With 
entry costs, investors benefit from stock market participation only if the (certainty equivalent) 
expected excess return from participation exceeds the fixed cost. Since the gain increases with 
wealth, entry costs make strong predictions about the relation between wealth and the 
probability of investing in stocks. In particular, investors with wealth below a certain 
threshold do not enter the stock market, those above it do. 
Empirical evidence in Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) documents a strong positive 
correlation between stock market participation and household financial wealth in many 
industrialized countries, supporting the entry costs thesis.1 But there is also the international 
evidence that many affluent households do not invest in stocks which suggests that other 
forces than entry costs alone may be at work. Furthermore, the entry cost literature does not 
explain the origin and nature of these costs. Yet understanding what inhibits stock market 
participation is crucial for policies aimed at encouraging portfolio diversification and 
spreading the “equity culture”. 
In this paper we call attention to information costs and barriers as an explanation for the 
                                                 
1 The evidence is based on detailed microeconomic data for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
the United States and the United Kingdom.  
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stockholding puzzle. The barrier we consider is awareness of the menu of assets available, 
and particularly of stocks, mutual funds and the like. In a seminal paper, Merton (1987) 
related portfolio incompleteness and heterogeneity to lack of information on investment 
opportunities, calling attention to the indisputable fact that investors purchase only securities 
they know about. Merton showed that even in the absence of monetary transaction costs, 
portfolio choice depends on the particular asset menu known to each investor. So, quite 
obviously, lack of awareness is a complementary explanation for the stockholding puzzle. 
The question then becomes how important is awareness in practice? We use a recent 
survey of Italian households with detailed data on awareness of financial assets. The survey 
uncovers considerable lack of basic financial information: 35 percent of potential investors 
are not aware of stocks, and 50 percent of mutual funds. The magnitude of these numbers 
suggests that asset awareness might be of first order importance in determining portfolio 
selection. 
One could argue that since potential investors could obtain information by spending 
resources on financial advice, such explanations of the stockholding puzzle are 
indistinguishable from those based on entry costs. But this is incorrect. Suppose an individual 
could obtain a list of all available assets at a fixed cost. To be able to choose whether it is 
worthwhile to pay the fixed cost and receive the list or invest only in the assets of which he is 
already aware, he would have to be able to compute the benefits of knowing the list before 
buying it. But this implies that he must already be aware of the existence of the assets (and of 
their risk and return) before paying the cost. In other words, awareness is not a choice 
variable, but exogenous with respect to individual choice. 
What, then, does explain asset awareness? Why do some individuals know about some 
assets and others not? And what are the mechanisms through which individuals become 
aware? As Merton (1977) points out, awareness affects asset prices because those that are less 
widely known, and thus less commonly selected, pay a premium. This makes it worthwhile 
for firms to invest resources in spreading information about their own stocks, suggesting one 
possible avenue through which investors gain awareness. When assets are not distributed 
directly by firms, financial intermediaries and asset distributors have a similar incentive to 
inform, because profits increase with the number of adopters. 
In this paper we generalize these ideas, confront them with the data and provide 
evidence on the determinants of financial awareness. We present a simple framework to  
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analyze the seller’s decision on the number of signals to send to potential investors. Both the 
production of signals and asset purchase, once investors become aware of it, are costly. 
In principle, lack of awareness can explain the stockholding puzzle even without entry 
costs. However, our model shows that awareness and entry costs interact, with additional 
interesting insights. Entry costs do not just limit investors’ opportunity set directly; they also 
discourage financial intermediaries from informing potential investors. When entry costs are 
high, there is little incentive to incur the cost of information because purchase remains 
unlikely. So a reduction in entry costs affects stockholding two ways: directly, as more people 
purchase stocks, and indirectly as the incentive to inform potential investors is greater, which 
in turn increases the number of aware investors and their market participation. 
Learning from financial intermediaries is just one of way that people become aware of 
investment opportunities. Many learn from other individuals through social interaction, which 
is another channel for spreading the “equity culture”. Hence, we extend our framework to 
allow for social learning, and show that social interaction indeed increases the probability that 
individuals become financially aware. However, we also show that, depending on parameter 
values, more intense social interaction may induce asset suppliers to rely on word-of-mouth 
rather than direct information production, thus saving on information dissemination costs. 
Besides Merton’s paper and the literature on the stockholding puzzle, our work is 
related to three further strands of the literature: financial information, social learning, and 
advertisement. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrecchia (1980) examined how 
information on asset returns affects portfolio choice. In these models differences among 
investors are endogenous, and financial information reduces subjective uncertainty on returns. 
Wealthier investors benefit more from financial information and are therefore better informed. 
Peress (2004) studies stock market participation in this framework allowing also for fixed 
entry costs.2 In contrast to our approach, these papers assume that investors are aware of all 
available assets but can acquire information, improving the precision of their subjective 
expectations of asset returns, whereas in our framework potential investors cannot choose to 
become aware.   
The recent literature on portfolio choice and social interactions signals, as an important 
                                                 
2 Peress shows that three types of investors coexist in equilibrium. Poor investors do not buy stocks and are not 
informed. For intermediate levels of wealth, investors buy stocks but choose to remain uninformed. Rich 
investors choose to buy stocks and to acquire information. That is, stock market participation and the amount of 
information increase with wealth.  
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channel of accumulation of financial information, the exchange of opinions among friends 
and peers and that investors have a preference for familiar firms. Duflo and Saez (2002), for 
instance, find that participation in pension plans is affected by one’s peers’ choices, and 
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) show that social interactions promote investment in stocks. 
Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) provide empirical evidence that familiarity with the firm 
affects investors’ behavior. Specifically, they measure a firm’s overall visibility with 
investors by its product market advertising, and show that firms with greater advertising 
expenditures have a larger number of individuals and institutional investors, and better 
liquidity of their stocks.3 
One way to explain these findings is that social individuals have lower information 
costs. Rather than inferring the role of social learning from the stock market participation 
decision, we are able to provide a direct test of the effect of social learning on awareness, thus 
providing important insights into the mechanism by which social learning affects 
stockholding.4 But we also point out that social interactions can limit asset suppliers’ 
incentive to produce costly information, because market participants can rely also on 
information collected and (freely) passed over by others through social contacts.  
Finally, the paper is related to the industrial organization literature on advertisement, as 
summarized by Tirole (1989). Our empirical analysis considers that literature’s point that the 
incentives to disseminate information are affected by market structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
theoretical framework on information production and dissemination. Section 3 describes the 
data and the indicators of financial awareness. Section 4 tests the basic implications of the 
model of financial awareness, with special focus on the effect of household characteristics, 
costs of information production, and social learning. Section 5 explores the implications of 
awareness for the stockholding puzzle and for the estimation of entry costs. We first compute 
the probability of investing in stocks and other risky assets in a sample of aware investors. We 
then impute the probability on a sample of unaware investors and estimate the quantitative 
                                                 
3 In a related paper, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document that distance, language and culture explain 
patterns of stockholding in Finland, and that investors are more likely to buy and sell stocks of companies that 
are close to the investor's location, that communicate in the investor’s native tongue and that have chief 
executives of the same cultural background. 
4 Social interactions may increase stockholding not only because social individuals may become better 
informed, but also because social interaction enhances trust in others, including brokers and funds managers, as 
suggested by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004).   
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impact of awareness on stockholding. There is evidence that failure to consider the awareness 
factor leads to overestimation of participation costs. Section 6 summarizes the results. 
 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
 
We argued in the introduction that awareness of the existence of stocks (or, for that 
matter, any financial asset) is exogenous to the investor’s choice set. But then, how is it that 
some investors are aware of a wide menu of financial assets, others only a small set of 
investment opportunities? And how do individuals come to know about financial assets? Here 
we address these questions, singling out some of the key determinants of awareness and 
obtaining predictions that can be tested empirically. Like Merton (1987), we stress that 
issuers and distributors of financial assets have strong incentives to inform the pool of 
potential investors; broadening the investor base lowers the cost of raising external capital for 




Although the analyses applies equally well to any financial asset, we focus on stocks. 
Let b denote the unit profit from increasing the stockholder base by one unit. There are N 
potential investors. The expected benefit for the issuer is the product of unit profit b and the 
expected amount invested in stocks: 
 
N a I A p I bp ) | ( ) ( , 
 
where p(I) denotes the probability that an investor is aware of the stock, p(A|I) the probability 
that he will buy the stock, conditional on knowing about it, and a  the average amount 
invested by those buying the stock. We assume that entry costs affect the participation 
decision, so that not all investors buy stocks and p(A|I)<1.5 As we shall see, one implication 
of this assumption is that entry costs affect the issuer’s incentive to inform potential investors. 
If issuers are able to sort potential investors into groups with similar characteristics the 
                                                 
5 In the standard portfolio model with no entry costs, p(A|I)=1, and only those who are not aware of stocks do  
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analysis can be thought of as applying to one of these groups. Even though for simplicity we 
do not keep track of the group index, note that if potential investors are sorted into similar 
groups,  a I A p ) | (  will differ across groups and depend on their characteristics.  
Issuers and distributors can broaden the investor base by disseminating information 
about their stocks, by such means as mailings, advertising in the financial press or direct 
contacts with potential investors. Let S denote the number of information signals, contacts or 
ads sent. The probability that an investor receives the signal and becomes aware increases 
with the number of signals. However, some investors may never receive a signal even if the 
number of signals is very large, because the information technology never reaches them (for 
instance, they don’t read newspapers and have no contacts with financial intermediaries). The 













Equation (1) posits that the probability of receiving a signal increases with the number 
of signals per potential investor, S/N. The parameter β>0 measures the efficiency of the 
information technology. A lower value of β implies that a given number of signals entails a 
larger P(I). As the number of signals approaches infinity, P(I) converges to 1, the faster the 
lower is β. But for finite number of signals, P(I) < 1. 
Producing a signal costs c euros to the issuer, who chooses the number of signals in 
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From the first order condition of the problem, one obtains: 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
not buy them. 
6  If potential investors are sorted in K groups, the issuer chooses the number of signals for each group 
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The optimal number of signals falls with the cost of a signal and increases with the 
probability of buying conditional on receiving the signal and being aware, and with the 
average amount invested by buyers. If the latter is too small, issuers may not send any signal, 
because too few investors would buy even if they received the signal. This will occur if 
b
c
a I A P
β
≤ ) | ( . 
The point here is that entry costs and awareness interact. Lower entry costs affect stock 
market participation directly, encouraging aware investors to buy. But they can also increase 
participation indirectly, because issuers find it more profitable to send signals when they have 
a strong impact on the stockholder base, while if entry costs are so high as to discourage most 
investors from buying, issuers will be less willing to spend on advertising. 
Substituting equation (3) into (1), we obtain an expression for the probability of 
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The probability of becoming informed is an increasing function of the probability of buying 
stocks (if aware) and a decreasing function of the cost of the signal. These are neat empirical 
predictions which will be confronted with the data in Section 4. 
                                                                                                                                                          
expression similar to equation (3) in the text for each group.   
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2.2. Social learning 
 
Besides learning from signals and contacts with issuers and distributors, individuals 
often learn about investment opportunities from peers who have been informed by financial 
intermediaries. Social learning changes distributors’ incentives and hence the optimal signal 
policy. How this occurs depends on the specific process of social learning and on how people 
interact. 
The simplest case is one in which each potential investor interacts sequentially with 
another investor. Suppose that individual i has a probability 0<δ<1 of meeting individual i+1. 
The probability δ increases with the strength of social networks and exchange in a 
community. If i+1 is aware, then i also becomes aware. Thus, i can become aware if he 
receives a signal – with probability given in equation (1) which we denote s here – or because 
he does not receive a signals, which occurs with probability 1–s , but meets i+1, provided i+1 
is aware. In turn, i+1 is aware with probability s given again by (1) or because he does not 
receive a signal but meets and learns from i+2 with probability δ, provided again i+2 is aware. 
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which is bounded between zero and 1. Note that, for given s, the probability of being aware is 
larger with social learning than without social learning. In fact  [ ] ) 1 ( 1 / 1 s − −δ  = µ >1 is the 
social learning multiplier. Social learning amplifies the effectiveness of a given signal, which 
thus has a better chance of reaching a potential investor. Second, the social multiplier 
increases with the extent of social interactions as parameterized by δ. Third, an increase in the 
intensity of social interactions has a stronger impact on the social multiplier the lower is the 
value of s, the frequency of signals. Using equation (6) to solve problem (2) gives the optimal 
















Equation (7) implies that the with social learning it is less likely that an intermediary will 
send no signals; this will occur only if 
b
c








threshold for no signals if there is no social learning. 
In our setting, the existence of social learning is equivalent to a more efficient 
information technology and this makes it more rewarding to send a positive number of 
signals. However, assuming a positive number of signals is optimally sent, equation (7) 
implies that an increase in the intensity of social learning has an ambiguous effect on the 
optimal number of signals. It is easy to check that an increase in the intensity of social 
learning (a higher value of δ) lowers the number of signals if 
b
c
a I A P
) 1 (
4 ) | (
δ β −
> . 
Thus, for some parameters’ values, financial assets distributors choose to rely on 
social interactions to spread financial information, thereby saving the cost of sending signals. 
This is an important point because it implies that social interactions can undermine agents’ 
incentives to invest in information gathering/spreading as they may choose to wait and 
receive information for free in the social context. 
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and implies that the probability of being aware increase with the intensity of social learning. 
These are additional propositions that can be tested empirically. 7 
                                                 
7 Needless to say, the quantitative effect of social learning on the signal policy and the degree of awareness will 
depend on the structure of the network. The structure assumed in our example is one where learning is 
directional (individual j learns from individual j+1 but not vice versa) and sequential (j can learn from individual 
j+1 but not from j+k, with k>1). This structure is clearly arbitrary as any other one, and a priori it is not obvious 
what a “realistic” network structure looks like. For instance, if the structure is sequential but not directional, so 
that learning can occur in both directions, the probability of being aware depends on the signal according to the  
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3. Measuring financial awareness  
 
We explore the determinants of financial awareness using the 1995 and 1998 Surveys of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted by the Bank of Italy.8 The surveys 
collected information on wealth, both real and financial, as well as income and demographic 
characteristics. Before asking if households invest in any particular asset, and how much, 
interviewers elicit data on financial awareness. In particular, each household head reports 
whether he or she is aware of the existence of financial assets by answering, for each asset 
category, the following question: 
 
I will show you a list of possible forms of saving. I would like you to tell me which 
forms of saving you (or another member of your household) know, even if only by 
hearsay. 
 
The financial asset categories refer to types of assets available to potential investors. 
Some of the categories correspond to a single asset (for instance, checking accounts and 
specific types of government bonds, quite popular in Italy), but others refer to broad groups of 
assets (for instance, stocks, mutual funds, and corporate bonds). Unfortunately, the survey 
does not distinguish between mutual funds and investment accounts that are predominantly 
bonds or stocks. 
Two points about the wording of the questions are worth stressing. First, those who are 
not aware of stocks or mutual funds should not be aware of any stock. But even those who 
report that they do know about stocks are likely to know about only a small set. Therefore 
                                                                                                                                                          
relation: 
2 ) 1 ( 2








− − − + − −
= . For given values of s and δ, this probability is larger than if 
learning is directional, as in equation (6). However, the qualitative results of the model are the same: the effect 
of the intensity of interactions on the number of signals is ambiguous, but the probability of being aware is 
larger with social interactions than without.  
  
8 The SHIW collects detailed data on demographic variables, households’ consumption, income and balance 
sheets. The survey covers 8,135 households in 1995 and 7,147 in 1998. In each year, the surveys are 
representative samples of the Italian resident population. Sampling is in two stages, first municipalities and then 
households. Municipalities are divided into 51 strata defined by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size 
(more than 40,000, 20,000 to 40,000, less than 20,000). Households are randomly selected from registry office 
records. Households are defined as groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing the 
same dwelling. The net response rate (ratio of responses to contacted households net of ineligible units) was 57 
percent in 1995 and 44 percent in 1998. The SHIW archive can be downloaded from the web site 
www.bancaditalia.it or obtained by writing to: Bank of Italy, Research Department, Via Nazionale 91, 00186  
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their portfolio should be more diversified than that of totally uninformed individuals, but they 
might still invest in only a few stocks, contrary to the implication of the classical portfolio 
theory that in equilibrium all stocks should be held. 
Second, the question distinguishes between aware and unaware individuals, but not 
between individuals who, apart from its existence, know very little about the asset - such as 
past returns, volatility and liquidity - and more sophisticated investors. Finer data would of 
course shed further light on the determinants of financial information and on the effects of 
financial information on household portfolios.9 
After answering questions on financial awareness, the same individuals are asked two 
sets of questions to identify assets selected in the past and assets held at the end of the year: 
 
Have you or any other member of your household ever invested in …[this 
particular asset] at any time in your life? 
 
Did you or any of your household members have… [this particular asset] at the 
end of the previous year? 
 
Table 1 reports data on awareness of 14 types of financial asset, investment over the 
lifetime, and holdings at the end of the year. The answers must be mutually consistent. If an 
asset is owned or was previously owned, the respondent should report that the asset is known. 
If an asset is currently owned, the respondent should report that he has previously purchased 
the asset. These consistency requirements apply to each individual in the sample and to each 
asset. Inconsistency is very rare, causing less than 1 percent of the sample to be discarded. 
Many households are aware of the existence of certain assets even when they do not 
invest in them. Not surprisingly, the most popular assets are transaction accounts (checking, 
savings and postal accounts), short-term government bonds (BOT and CCT), and bonds 
issued by the national postal service. About 5 percent of the sample do not know of the 
existence of checking accounts and 25 percent have never had one. Part of the reason is that 
some people, especially the elderly and the poor, use post-office accounts, a close substitute. 
The most interesting statistics refer to riskier assets. Over one third of the sample are 
                                                                                                                                                          
Roma, Italy. 
9 The wording of the question indicates that the respondent should report being aware of the asset also if another 
household member is aware. This is unlikely to be a problem. Information flows within the household and if a 
member is aware of an asset, the information is passed to the other members as well. Where financial decisions 
are a collective choice, awareness by one of the members is shared with the other members. And where financial 
investment is not a collective choice, the head, as defined by the SHIW, is the person in charge of the financial  
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not aware of stocks, 50 percent do not know about mutual funds and corporate bonds, and 
almost 70 percent are unaware of investment accounts. Combining, less than 30 percent of the 
sample is simultaneously aware of stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts. Except for 
stocks, awareness increases by 6 or 7 percentage points between 1995 and 1998 for mutual 
funds, investment accounts and corporate bonds. 
The other columns in Table 1 document the Italian stockholding puzzle and the lack of 
diversification of most household portfolios. In 1995 only 5 percent were direct stockholders, 
and 7.8 percent in 1998.10 In 1998 total stock market participation through stocks, mutual 
funds or investment accounts was just 15 percent. The standard explanation of this asset 
allocation puzzle cites entry costs. As we shall see in Section 5, asset awareness is a 
complementary explanation. 
The data can be used to construct summary indicators of financial awareness. One 
measure is simply the number of assets that each individual knows about divided by the 
number of potential assets (14 in all). A second measure is an index that gives less weight to 
popular assets (such as checking accounts) than to assets that are less widely known (such as 
corporate bonds and mutual funds). In practice, we weight the index by the inverse of the 
proportion of people aware of the asset, and scale it by the sum of the weights.11 
The two indicators are obviously very strongly correlated and provide useful summary 
statistics of financial awareness. They can also be conveniently related to household 
characteristics in the descriptive and regression analysis of Section 4. Sample statistics on the 
two indexes of financial awareness are reported in Table 2. On average, in 1998 respondents 
were aware of 59 percent of the assets (50 percent using the weighted index). The cross-
sectional distribution of the index reveals considerable heterogeneity of potential investors. 
Households in the first quartile of the distribution are aware of only one third of the assets (4 
out of 14). Those in the fourth quartile are aware of at least 12 assets; 15 percent of the 
sample reports being aware of all asset categories. 
                                                                                                                                                          
decisions of the household. 
10 This is an overestimate of indirect stockholding because some households have mutual funds that invest 
predominantly or exclusively in bonds or in the money market. Since the survey does not distinguish between 
different categories of mutual funds and investment accounts, we assume that if a household has a mutual fund 
or an investment account he invests at least part of his wealth in stocks. 
11 For instance, checking accounts have a weight of 1.046, stocks 1.64.  
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4. The determinants of financial awareness 
 
The model outlined in Section 2 has three relevant testable implications. First, issuers 
will target the individuals (or groups) that have a greater probability of investing in the stock 
market. Clearly, the benefits of a euro spent on information are greater where, once 
individuals are aware of investment opportunities, the chances of adoption are high. Second, 
individuals are more likely to be aware where the cost of sending signals is lower, e.g. in 
areas where the cost of contacting investors is relatively low. Third, awareness should be 
higher in areas where the chance of learning from others is higher, because in those areas one 
can learn from peers as well as from the general media and from intermediaries.  
In the model we have implicitly assumed that issuers send signals evenly to all potential 
investors, and have related the incentive to send signals to the average probability of buying 
among the aware, multiplied by the average amount invested by those who do buy the stock, 
or p(A|I)a . This is a reasonable assumption if information is communicated through, say, TV 
or other general media, so that in principle all potential investors are contacted. However, 
advertisement is costly, and it is unwise to send signals to people who are unlikely to buy 
stocks even if informed about them. 
A more realistic case is one in which issuers or distributors observe some characteristics 
of potential investors that are correlated with the probability of buying stocks and the amount 
invested. Then, issuers are able to group potential investors according to these characteristics 
and target the likely buyers. The immediate implication is that the probability of receiving a 
signal also depends on a set of observable individual characteristics associated with 
stockholding. 
In the empirical analysis we focus on household resources (income, financial wealth, 
real wealth), age and education as proxies for the probability of adoption and the average 
amount invested, p(A|I)a . Since with fixed costs of adoption the affluent are more likely to 
buy stocks and invest larger amounts, they will receive more signals and will therefore be 
more likely to be aware. A similar argument applies to individuals with university education 
and to younger people, in-so-far as they follow the practice of financial advisors of investing 
more in stocks when young.12 On the other hand, groups with very low probability of buying 
                                                 
12 Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) show that this popular advice is supported by theoretical arguments.  
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stocks are not targeted and remain unaware, unless there are information spillovers from other 
individuals. 
In order to test the relation between awareness and the cost of sending signals we rely 
on geographical differences in newspapers readership. We focus on sales of national 
newspapers (defined as newspapers sold in at least half of the Italian provinces) as they host 
the greatest portion of financial product advertisement. Most importantly for our purposes, the 
cost of advertising financial products in national newspapers is borne out at the national level 
and reflects the overall readership, rather than local readership. Therefore, the effective cost 
of contacting investors and spreading information is lower in areas where newspapers sales 
are highest. For example, suppose that the cost of sending a signal using a national newspaper 
is x, that there are two regions and that readership is twice as large in the first region. Then 
the effective cost of contacting an unaware investor will be twice as large in the second 
region. Thus, one driving variable of awareness should be newspaper readership, as measured 
by the number of copies sold in the local market scaled by the local population. This ratio, 
computed by pooling together the 14 newspapers that sell in at least half of the Italian 
provinces, varies considerably across provinces, ranging from less than 1 newspaper per 100 
inhabitants in the Sicilian provinces of Agrigento, Caltanissetta and Enna to over 15 
newspapers in the Northern provinces of Genoa, Piacenza and Ravenna.13 The cost of 
contacting investors through the general press is accordingly lower in, say, Genoa than 
Agrigento.  
As a proxy for social interactions – our third determinant of awareness – we use the 
number of voluntary organizations – excluding sport clubs and organizations that represent 
group interests - per 1,000 inhabitants in each province.14 As shown in Figure 1, the indicator 
varies considerably across provinces, from a minimum of 0.07 in the Southern province of 
Foggia to a maximum of 0.18 in Genoa. The chart also shows that social interactions are more 
intense in the Northern provinces, suggesting that our regressions must control for North-
South differences to avoid simply picking up a North-South divide. 
Although it is not obvious a priori how to measure the intensity of social interactions in 
                                                 
13 The list includes: Avvenire, Corriere della Sera, Giornale, Il Giorno, Italia Oggi, Manifesto, Il Mattino, Il 
Messaggero, Repubblica, Il Resto del Carlino, Il Secolo XIX, Il Sole 24 Ore, La Stampa, Il Tempo. We exclude 
sport newspapers as they are not used as a vehicle for financial information. Restricting the list to the 5 largest 
national newspapers (Corriere della Sera, Repubblica, La Stampa, and the two business papers Sole 24 Ore and 
Italia Oggi) does not change the econometric results.   
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a community, alternative available measures tend to be highly correlated. In fact, as shown by 
Putnam (1993) with reference to Italian regions, communities that are more social in one 
dimension (e.g. participation in voluntary organizations concerned with health, such as blood 
donation) tend also to be more social in other dimensions (e.g. participation in political 
movements, recreational and charity groups, engagement in the civic community, etc.). 
 
4.1. Descriptive evidence  
 
We start with a graphical analysis of the correlation between financial awareness and 
education, age, wealth, density of financial salesmen and social learning. In each case, we 
graph awareness of stocks, mutual funds, investment accounts, corporate bonds and the 
overall index of financial information separately. We choose to focus on the weighted index 
for all financial assets and for the four risky assets combined. Results for the unweighted 
index, not reported for brevity, are similar. In each graph we merge 1995 and 1998 data. In 
the regression analysis, however, we introduce a time dummy to distinguish between the two 
surveys. 
The relation between education and information (Figure 2) is positive and quite strong. 
The proportion of individuals aware of stocks increases from 25 percent for those with no 
more than elementary education to 80 percent for those with a university degree. Over the 
same range of education, the proportion aware of mutual funds raises from 5 to 60 percent, 
and the overall index of financial awareness from 20 to 75 percent. 
In Figure 3 we plot the proportion of households aware of stocks, mutual funds, 
investment accounts, corporate bonds and the index of financial awareness by year of birth. 
Awareness clearly increases with year-of-birth, particularly for cohorts born between 1910 
and 1945. Subsequent cohorts (born 1946-70) display only a moderate increase in awareness, 
for each of the assets considered. 
With only two years of data, we cannot identify the separate effects of cohort and age. If 
we were to interpret the data in terms of age, absent any cohort effect, we would conclude that 
financial information falls with age, with the implausible implication that people start to 
decumulate past knowledge around retirement age. In our interpretation, rather, year-of-birth 
is one of the observable variables used by intermediaries to target potential investors. Since 
                                                                                                                                                          
14 The source is 1° Censimento delle istituzioni private e imprese nonprofit - anno 2000, Istat (2002).  
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younger cohorts tend to invest more in risky assets and are more likely to participate, they 
will also receive more signals and thus be more likely to be aware.15 
The relation between wealth and financial awareness in Figure 4 is positive, consistent 
with the hypothesis that financial intermediaries target the affluent. Furthermore, the relation 
is non-linear. At low levels of wealth (less than 2,500 euros), the relation is strongly positive. 
At higher levels, the correlation is still positive but attenuated. This suggests considering non-
linear terms in wealth in the regression analysis below. 
Figure 5 plots the proportion of aware individuals and the index of financial awareness 
against the cost of sending signals, as proxied by the number of national newspapers sold per 
100 inhabitants in a province. Awareness is positively correlated with readership, particularly 
at low levels of readership. Figure 6 displays a positive relation between awareness and the 
index of social learning, in agreement with the model of Section 2. 
Overall, the descriptive evidence is consistent with the predictions of the model which 
relates the mechanism through which consumers become aware of available assets to the 
economic incentives of issuers and distributors. 
 
4.2. Econometric analysis 
 
Education, financial resources, and birth cohort are correlated variables: notoriously 
education and income or wealth are positively correlated, while wealth and income vary in 
predictable ways with age, as life cycle models imply. Education and wealth are also likely to 
be correlated with social learning, because the wealthy and individuals with higher education 
are more likely to interact and learn from others. To account for these correlations and to 
isolate the contribution of each factor while holding others constant, we run probit regressions 
for the probability of individuals being aware of stocks, mutual funds, investment accounts 
and corporate bonds, and Tobit regressions for the index of financial information.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics – mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
value – for all the variables used in the estimation. Data are pooled over 1995 and 1998. 
Household head is defined as the person primarily responsible for economic decisions. They 
                                                 
15 If we interpreted the profile in Figure 2 in terms of age rather than cohort, a flat or even declining age-
information profile would also contrast with the hypothesis set forth by King and Leape (1987), who explain the 
increasing pattern of asset diversification over the life-cycle in terms of a positive relation between age and  
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are males in about 70 percent of the cases; on average, financial wealth is 18,000 euros, and 
real wealth about 120,000 euros; over 20 percent of the sample have a high school diploma, 7 
percent a university degree and 1 percent an economic degree. Comparison between the two 
surveys indicates that the sample is quite stable in demographic structure, education of the 
head and regional location.  
Besides controlling simultaneously for economic resources (financial wealth, real 
wealth, household disposable income), education, year-of-birth, social learning and density of 
financial intermediaries, we include in each regression a dummy variable for whether the 
household head is married or male and a time dummy to control for differences between 
survey years. We also include the Herfindhal index in each province and year, as a proxy for 
the competitive structure of local financial markets. The literature on advertisement suggests 
that the competitive structure of the market affects producers’ incentives to disseminate 
information on their products (Tirole, 1989). If the gains from spreading information can be 
appropriated by the competitors – as in industries with relatively high product substitution 
and low market power – issuers would have less incentive to disseminate basic information. 
However, the coefficient of this variable never turns out to be statistically different from zero. 
As another indicator of banks’ behavior affecting stock and other financial assets 
awareness, we define a dummy variable taking the value of one if the respondent has a long-
term relation (more than 10 years, or more than 5 years) with a bank. Our hypothesis is that, 
controlling for age, education and economic resources, banks are more likely to target 
individuals on which they have accumulated more information (for instance, because they 
have a more precise assessment of financial wealth and portfolio behavior). These individuals 
are therefore more likely to have received signals in the past, and, therefore, more informed. 
Since we use provincial variability to measure differences in the cost of distributing 
information, in the intensity of social learning and to proxy competition in the local markets, 
the standard errors of our estimates are adjusted for clustering. Furthermore, to make sure that 
our geographical indicators do not pick up differences between the North and the South that 
just happen to be correlated with measures of social interactions and the cost of distributing 
information, we add to the regression a dummy variable for the North. To make sure that 
social interactions and newspaper readership are not picking up geographical differences in 
                                                                                                                                                          
financial sophistication.  
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economic development, we have also expanded the set of regressors to include provincial per 
capita GDP and the provincial unemployment rate. Since these variables were never 
statistically different from zero, they are dropped in the reported specification. 
The probit results in Table 4 confirm the patterns in Figures 2 to 6. The coefficients of 
the cohort dummies are positive for each of the assets considered, indicating that the older 
cohorts are less likely to be aware than the young. Education is a strong predictor of financial 
awareness. In particular, having a university degree is associated with an increase of 17 
percentage points in the probability of being aware of stocks, and of 25 points for mutual 
funds, investment accounts and corporate bonds. Having an economic degree further 
increases the probability of awareness of mutual funds, investment accounts and corporate 
bonds by 13 to 21 points. Only in the case of stocks is the coefficient of the dummy for an 
economic degree not statistically different from zero. 
The coefficients on financial wealth, real wealth and income indicate that the awareness 
is positive correlated to individual resources. Increasing simultaneously the three variables 
from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of their distribution, raises the probability of being aware 
of stocks by 13 percentage points, and that for mutual funds, investment accounts and 
corporate bonds by 18, 11 and 19 points, respectively. Experimenting with quadratic terms of 
these variables does not change these conclusions. Our interpretation is that these correlations 
reflect the incentives of intermediaries to target financial information primarily towards 
individuals with a higher probability of actually buying the financial instruments they 
advertise.16 
The dummy for long-term bank relation (more than 10 years) has a strong impact on 
awareness, between 5 and 8 percentage points, depending on the asset considered. Since we 
are holding constant age, education and economic resources, the most plausible interpretation 
of this effect is that it is “supply-driven”: banks have a greater incentive to inform individuals 
on which they have superior information. Results are unchanged if long-term relations are 
defined over 5-years. 
Newspaper readership has a positive impact on awareness, and its coefficient is highly 
                                                 
16  Another possibility is that education and wealth proxy for individual characteristics that are related to 
individual exposure to financial information. For instance, the better educated and the affluent may have access 
to circles where financial information is more easily available, and therefore have more frequent contacts with 
financial intermediaries. Given the reduced form of our regressions, we cannot distinguish this particular 
channel from the explicit targeting of some population groups by financial intermediaries suggested by our  
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significant in all the regressions. Increasing readership from the lowest (the Sicilian province 
of Agrigento) to the highest value (the Northern province of Ravenna) raises the probability 
of stock awareness by 5.4 percentage points and that of being aware of mutual funds, 
investment accounts and corporate bonds by 25, 23, and 21 points, respectively. Similar 
results are obtained if we use the provincial readership of the top five national newspapers or 
of the leading national economic newspapers (Il Sole 24 Ore and Italia Oggi). 
The coefficient of the proxy for social learning is positive in all regressions, and 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels for stocks, investment accounts and 
corporate bonds. Raising the index of social learning from the lowest to the highest value 
(Foggia and Genoa, respectively) increases the probability of being aware of stocks by 12 
percentage points; for mutual funds, investment accounts and corporate bonds the respective 
figures are 14, 12 and 8 percentage points.17 To make sure that our results are not driven by 
the particular measure chosen we check their robustness with an alternative measure: the 
number of non profit organizations, scaled by population in the province (Mortara, 1985). A 
non-profit institution is any organization whose status does not allow its members, founders 
or those in control, to obtain any income or other yield through it. The estimates show that 
also this proxy of social interactions has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
financial awareness. 
Table 5 presents a Tobit regression for the weighted index of financial awareness using 
the same specification as in Table 4. A two-limit Tobit estimator is warranted because the 
index ranges from 0 for 248 individuals reporting being aware of no asset at all, to 1 for 2,585 
individuals aware of all 14 assets. Also in this case standard errors are adjusted for provincial 
cluster effects. We report results for the index based on all financial assets and for that 
referring to risky assets only. In both cases the results confirm the evidence on individual 
assets. Awareness is strongly correlated with education, year-of-birth, wealth, long-term 
banks relations, newspaper readership and the index of social learning. 
Raising economic resources (financial wealth, real wealth, and disposable income) from 
the 25
th to the 75
th percentile increases the overall index of financial awareness by 9 
                                                                                                                                                          
model. 
17 Section 2 shows that more intense social interactions have an ambiguous effect on the optimal number of 
signals sent by financial intermediaries. Since we don’t observe the signals, we cannot estimate the relation 
between intensity of information production and strength of social interactions.  
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percentage points (15 percent if we consider the index relative to risky assets only). Long-
term relations increase the index by 6.5 percentage points. Increasing the density of 
newspaper readership and the index of social learning from the lowest to the highest value 
increases the overall index by 8 and 11 percentage points, respectively. Like Table 4, this is 





Financial awareness carries major implications for at least two important issues in the 
analysis of household portfolios: the extent to which lack of awareness explains the 
stockholding puzzle, and whether failing to consider asset awareness leads to overstating 
participation costs. 
Consider a situation in which investors can choose between a safe and a risky asset 
(bonds and stocks). Stocks yield an equity premium equal to r ~ , distributed according to the 
p.d.f.  ) ~ (r g , with expected value  0 ~ > = r r E  and variance 
2 σ . We normalize the return on 
bonds to one and assume that in some states of the world r ~ <0 so that stocks do not dominate 
bonds. 
Each investor i is endowed with wealth  i w  and invests a fraction of wealth  i α  in stocks. 
The investor must pay a fixed entry cost fi (say, a brokerage fee) to enter the stock market. If 
he chooses to purchase stocks, he pays fi and invests  i α wi in stocks; otherwise he keeps all of 
his wealth in bonds. 
There are two types of investors, aware and unaware. Aware investors know of the 
existence and characteristics of both assets and have the same information on the probability 
distribution of the stock return  ) ~ (r g . The others are unaware that stocks exist. Hence, they 
can only invest in bonds, regardless of entry costs. The shadow cost of ignorance of stocks is 
r, the expected excess return.18 
Let  ) ( i x I  be an indicator function equal to 1 if the investor is aware and zero if 
                                                 
18 One could consider a third type of investor, aware of stocks but not well informed about the distribution of 
the return on them. For instance, he might perceive a p.d.f.  ) ~ (r gu with the same mean as  ) ~ (r g but larger 
variance. Other things equal, this investor is less likely than fully informed investors to enter the stock market.  
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unaware. As was shown in Sections 2 and 4, the indicator depends on a vector of 
characteristics i x which include the costs of disseminating financial information in the local 
market, the strength of social interactions, and personal characteristics, such as education, 
cohort, and wealth. If  0 ) ( = i x I  all wealth is invested in bonds and  0 = i α . If  1 ) ( = i x I , the 
problem of the aware investor is: 
 
[ ] ) )( 1 ~ ( max i i i f w r Eu − + α α  
 
and the optimal share invested in stocks,  *
i α , satisfies the first order condition: 
 
[ ] 0 ) ( ~ ) 1 ~ ( '
* ≡ − + i i i f w r r Eu α  
 
The investor chooses to invest in stocks if: 
 
[ ] ) ( ) )( 1 ~ (
*
i i i i w u f w r Eu > − + α  (9) 
 
If the benefit from stockholding exceeds the fixed cost, the investor chooses to purchase 
stocks, pays the fixed cost fi and invests  *
i α (wi -fi) in stocks. Given our assumptions,  *
i α  is 
strictly positive. Condition (9) indicates that, for given wi and fi, participation is more likely if 
the excess return is high. Since one additional euro of wealth increases the right-hand side 
more than the left-hand-side, there exists a sufficiently high level of wealth that triggers stock 
market participation. As entry costs approach zero, all aware investors purchase stocks. 
Equation (9) delivers three insights. First, if all investors are aware of stocks, everyone 
above the wealth threshold invests in stocks. Second, if there are no entry costs, the people 
who do not invest in stocks are simply those who are not aware of their existence. Third, with 
both unaware investors and entry costs, a person who does not invest in stocks may be 
uninformed or may have low wealth. 
Let now  i r ˆ be the certainty equivalent equity premium defined implicitly by19 
 
[ ] [ ] ) )( 1 ˆ ( ) )( 1 ~ (
* *
i i i i i i i f w r u f w r Eu − + = − + α α  
 
                                                 

















, where a is the investor's 
degree of relative risk aversion evaluated at final wealth.  
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All aware investors with wealth above  i w  purchase stocks; all unaware investors and all those 
with  i i w w <  do not. Equation (10) states that the wealth threshold increases with the fixed 
cost, risk aversion (because the optimal share 
*
i α  and the certainty equivalent premium r ˆ fall 
with risk aversion) and the variance of returns to stocks. Other things being equal, people who 
are willing to invest a large share of their wealth in stocks are more likely to enter the stock 
market because they have more to lose from not taking advantage of the equity premium. 
Using (10), one can compute the proportion of stockholders in the population as the 
product of the proportion of stockholders among aware investors and the probability of being 
aware: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 | ( = = ≥ = I prob I w w prob h i i  (11) 
  
If  1 ) 1 ( < = I prob , equation (11) implies that lack of awareness can account for at least 
part of the stockholding puzzle. Clearly, even if all consumers where informed (I = 1 for all 
investors), stock market participation would still be limited by entry costs. 
 
5.1. The stockholding puzzle  
 
A simple way to assess the importance of awareness in explaining the stockholding 
puzzle is to compare the proportion of investors who enter the stock market in the total 
sample with that in the restricted sample of aware investors. Table 6 indicates that if the 
unaware investors were aware of stocks - and their adoption probability were the same as that 
of the aware - the proportion of stockholders would increase by over 50 percent (that is, from 
5.6 to 8.7 percent). 
Table 6 also shows that awareness may have an even more important role in explaining 
lack of participation in mutual funds, investment accounts and corporate bonds. In each case 
the proportion investing in these assets would more then double if all investors were aware of 
these assets. The last row of Table 6 indicates that if all investors were aware of all risky  
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assets, total stockholding (stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts) would increase from 
12.6 to 27.6 percent. 
These simple estimates are subject to criticism, however, because the characteristics of 
aware investors are different from those of the unaware. Since the former tend to be richer 
and more educated, and since education, income and wealth are positively associated with 
stockholding, the simple calculation tends to overestimate the effect of awareness on 
participation. Therefore we refine our calculation, estimating the probability of aware 
investors being stockholders (or investing in any of the four assets considered) and then 
imputing the probability in the sample of unaware individuals. 
The imputed figures are obtained from a probit regression with Heckman sample 
selection in which the decision to invest in a particular asset is a function of age, education 
dummies, dummies for quartiles of financial wealth, real wealth and income, a dummy for 
residence in the north and a year dummy. Since each probit is performed on a sample of 
people who know the asset, and since the error term of the participation decision is potentially 
correlated with unobserved determinants of asset awareness, each probit is corrected for 
sample selection using the same specification for the probability of being aware as in Table 
4.20 The coefficient of the participation decision, not reported for brevity, confirm previous 
evidence: direct and indirect stock market participation increases with household resources 
and education, is higher in the North, and increases over time. 
As expected, considering the differing characteristics of aware and unaware investors, 
attenuates the effect of awareness on participation. Still, stock market participation would 
increase from 5.6 to 7.5 percent, mutual funds from 7.6 to 12.0, and investment accounts from 
1.8 to 3.1 percent. Overall, direct and indirect participation would almost double (from 12.6 to 
23 percent). 
Clearly, we still find that the proportion of aware investors is much larger than the 
proportion of households investing in the asset. For instance, while about 50 percent are 
aware of mutual funds (Table 1), less than 15 percent of this group actually invests in mutual 
funds (Table 6). Thus, while lack of awareness may help reconcile the theory with the data, 
other factors are needed to explain the stockholding puzzle, including monetary entry costs, 
                                                 
20 The participation equations confirm the standard results in the literature that wealth, both real and financial, 
income and education are statistically significant and important determinants of stockholding (Guiso, Haliassos 
and Jappelli, 2003).  
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indivisibilities, minimum investment requirements and lack of financial sophistication beyond 
asset awareness. 
 
5.2. Participation costs 
  
To address the relation between awareness and entry costs, consider again equation 
(10) and assume that the asset share invested in stocks and the certainty equivalent equity 
premium are the same for all investors. The condition for participating can then be expressed 
as: 
 









As in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), we use the joint 
distribution of wealth and stock ownership to infer information on the distribution of entry 
costs. As an example, suppose that r ˆ = 0.03, α = 0.3, and 10% of the households with w = € 
25,000 invest in the stock market. Then 10% of this group must have participation costs 
below  223
) 3 . 0 03 . 0 ( 1
000 , 25 3 . 0 03 . 0 =
× +
× ×  euro. If the entry cost f is not correlated with w, this also implies that 
10% of these households has participation costs lower than 296 euro.21 
To estimate the empirical distribution of entry costs, we split the sample into wealth 
percentiles and repeat the procedure for each different percentile. The lower line in Figure 7 
plots the fraction of total stockholders (defined as direct stockholders plus indirect 
stockholders through mutual funds and investment accounts) against participation costs for 
the total sample, i.e. without distinguishing between aware and unaware investors. Assuming, 
as in the example, r ˆ=0.03 and α=0.3, median entry costs so estimated are € 850 euro. 
The point is that some people do not invest in stocks because they are not aware of 
stocks, not because entry costs are too high. So entry costs should be estimated on the sample 
of aware investors, the only group that has the option of paying or not the fixed cost. In the 
                                                 
21  Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) considers three types of transaction costs: a pure entry cost, a per-period 
participation cost and a trading cost. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, she finds median per 
period participation costs of $800 in 1984, $500 in 1989, and $350 in 1994. Luttmer (1999) focuses on the lower 
bound of fixed costs that make consumption data consistent with data on asset returns, suggesting transaction 
costs of at least 3 percent of monthly consumption for an investor with log utility function. Paiella (2001) 
follows a similar approach, and using the same dataset as Vissing-Jorgensen estimates that annual participation  
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previous example, suppose that only 50 percent of the households with w = € 25,000 are 
aware of stocks. Then one should conclude that only 5 percent – not 10 – have participation 
costs lower than € 223. Clearly, the overestimation of entry costs increases with the fraction 
of unaware individuals.  
The upper line in Figure 7 reports an estimate of the distribution of entry costs in the 
restricted sample of aware investors. These are defined as those who are aware of stocks, 
mutual funds and managed investment accounts. The downward revision in participation 
costs is substantial. In fact, the median value in the restricted sample is about € 380, less than 
half the value in the total sample.22 The corresponding wealth threshold is € 31,700. 
It is worth noting that the calculation of participation costs could be refined by allowing 
for heterogeneity in the asset share invested in stocks, estimating a selection model for the 
asset share. Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) reports that this refinement does not appreciably 
change the estimated distribution of entry costs, given that models of the share invested in 




The point of departure is that in two large, representative cross-sections of Italian 
households a significant fraction of consumers are unaware of the existence of available 
financial instruments such as stocks and mutual funds. Starting from this observation, this 
paper makes three contributions to the literature on household portfolios. First, we propose an 
explanation for the mechanism whereby asset awareness may be acquired. Producers and 
distributors of financial assets have an incentive to disseminate information that is stronger 
when aware households are more likely to adopt the asset and when the cost of spreading 
information is lower. In addition, social learning facilitates awareness because it represents a 
further channel through which potential investors can become aware, though it may induce 
financial intermediaries to disseminate less information. 
We provide evidence consistent with these hypotheses. We find that awareness is 
                                                                                                                                                          
costs range from $95 to $175. 
22 This does not imply that considering awareness would reduce participation costs in the US by a comparable 
amount. It may well be that in the US the fraction of unaware individuals is much smaller, and so is the bias. 
Indeed, it is likely that US households are better informed than Italians. However, where the stock market is less 
developed and the mutual fund industry still lags behind, as in many European countries, the problem we are  
  32
positively affected by demographic variables – education, wealth, income and birth cohort – 
that increase the probability of purchasing stocks and the amount invested, long-term bank 
relations, the intensity of social interactions and national newspaper readership (as a proxy for 
the cost of disseminating information) in the area where investors live. 
In a third step of our analysis, we show that lack of awareness can help resolve part of 
the stockholding puzzle. Ignorance of investment opportunities is a specific impediment to 
stockholding that goes beyond the generic reference to fixed adoption costs as a cause of non-
participation typically found in the literature. Our calculations show that if all investors were 
aware of risky securities, participation in risky financial markets could increase substantially 
(and even double) from its current level. Yet we also find that a large fraction of potential 
investors do not own stocks even if aware, suggesting that entry costs are an important reason 
for non-participation even when awareness is accounted for. Our results also imply that 
estimates of participation costs that do not take awareness into account may be seriously 
biased upwards. In our data, if we ignore lack of awareness, median participation cost is 
estimated at €850; considering awareness lowers that figure to a more realistic value of € 380. 
Our model and empirical evidence also uncover important interactions between 
participation costs and awareness. Lower entry cost itself tends to increase awareness, 
because financial intermediaries’ incentive to invest resources to inform potential investors is 
greater. This, in turn, further increases stock market participation. Policies aimed at lowering 
transaction costs in financial markets should therefore take into account the interaction 
between entry costs, financial information and stockholding.  
An implication of our analysis is that lack of awareness can contribute to explain the 
home equity bias. If the cost of sending signals increases with the distance between the sender 
and the recipient, information will tend to be disseminated locally and individuals will be 
mostly aware of local stocks, consistent with the findings of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). 
Furthermore, since investors would tend to receive mostly signals from local firms, they will 
be aware of only a subset of available stocks and thus unable to diversify. 
                                                                                                                                                          




Bodie, Zvi, Robert C. Merton, and William F. Samuelson (1992), “Labor supply flexibility 
and portfolio choice in a life-cycle model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control 16, 427-49. 
 
Brandolini, Andrea, and Luigi Cannari (1994), “Methodological Appendix: the Bank of Italy's 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth,” in Saving and the accumulation of wealth: 
essays on Italian households and government behavior, Albert Ando, Luigi Guiso and 
Ignazio Visco (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Duflo, Esther, and Emmanuel Saez (2002), “Participation and investment decisions in a 
retirement plan: the influence of colleagues’ choices,” Journal of Public Economics 85, 
121-48. 
 
Gollier, Christian (2002), “What does the classical theory have to say about household 
portfolios?,” in Household Portfolios, Luigi Guiso, Tullio Jappelli and Michalis 
Haliassos (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Grinblatt, Mark, and Matti Keloharju (2001), “How distance, language and culture influence 
stockholding and trades,” Journal of Finance 56, 1053-73. 
 
Grossman, Sandy J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), “On the impossibility of informationally 
efficient markets,” American Economic Review 70, 393-408.  
 
Grullon, Gustavo, George Kanatas, and James P. Weston (2004) “Advertising, breadth of 
ownership, and liquidity,” Review of Financial Studies 17, 439-61. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Michalis Haliassos, and Tullio Jappelli (2002), Household Portfolios. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Michalis Haliassos, and Tullio Jappelli (2003), “Stockholding in Europe: where 
do we stand, and where do we go?” Economic Policy 36, April, 123-70. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2004), “The role of social capital in 
financial development,” American Economic Review (forthcoming). 
 
Hong, Harrison, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Jeremy C. Stein (2004), “Social interaction and stock 
market participation,” Journal of Finance 59, 137-63. 
 
King, Mervyn, and Jonathan Leape (1987), “Asset accumulation, information, and the life-
cycle,” NBER Working Paper n. 2392. 
 
Luttmer, Erzo G. J. (1999), “What level of fixed costs can reconcile consumption and stock 
returns?,” Journal of Political Economy 107, 969-98. 
 
Merton, Robert C. (1987), “A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete  
  34
information,” Journal of Finance 42, 483-510. 
 
Mortara, Andrea (1985), Le associazioni in Italia. Milano: Franco Angeli. 
 
Mulligan, Casey B., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2000), “Extensive margins and the demand for 
money at low interest rates,” Journal of Political Economy 108, 961-91. 
 
Paiella, Monica (2001), “Limited financial market participation: a transaction cost-based 
explanation.” London: IFS Working Paper 01/06. 
 
Panetta, Fabio, and Roberto Violi (1999), “Is there an equity premium puzzle in Italy? A look 
at assets returns, consumption and financial structure data over the last century.” Rome: 
Bank of Italy, Temi di Discussione n. 353. 
 
Peress, Joel (2004), “Wealth, information acquisition and portfolio choice,” The Review of 
Financial Studies 17, 879-914. 
 
Tirole, Jean (1989), The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Verrecchia, Robert E. (1982), “Information acquisition in a noisy rational expectations 
economy,” Econometrica 50, 1415-30. 
 
Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette (2004), “Perspectives on behavioral finance: does irrationality 
disappear with wealth? Evidence from expectations and actions,” in NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff (eds). Cambridge: 




Financial awareness: descriptive statistics 
 
The table is based on questions asked in the 1995 and 1998 SHIW about asset awareness, participation over the 
life cycle and current participation. BOT are Treasury Bills up to one-year maturity. CCT are floating-rates 
Treasury credit certificates, 2-4 years in maturity indexed to BOT. BTP are long-term, fixed interest rates 
government bonds. CTZ are zero-coupon Treasury credit certificates. Statistics are computed using population 
weights. All values are expressed in percentages. 
 
 
Financial asset  Aware of the asset  Has invested in the 
asset at least once  
Currently investing in 
the asset 
 
  1995  1998 1995 1998 1995 1998 
 
Checking  accounts  94.6  93.3 74.7 76.9 68.9 73.2 
Saving  accounts  92.1  88.6 49.2 47.2 26.7 28.0 
Postal accounts   87.6  82.7  17.6  18.2  9.6  11.5 
Certificates of deposit  57.9  61.8  10.5  11.5  5.3  3.7 
Government bonds: BOT  89.6  86.3  38.2  30.1  22.4  8.7 
Government bonds: CCT  77.5  73.7  13.9  14.2  7.8  4.4 
Government bonds: BTP  52.9  54.5  6.9  6.9  4.4  2.5 
Government bonds: CTZ  24.9  30.3  1.5  2.3  0.9  0.6 
Postal bonds  82.9  76.8  15.5  13.4  7.4  5.9 
Corporate  bonds  49.4  55.8  4.7 8.9 2.6 5.1 
Mutual  funds  48.4  55.5 7.0 13.7 4.2  9.6 
Investment  accounts  31.5  37.1  1.5 3.4 1.0 2.7 
Stocks  64.9  63.7 7.3 11.1 5.0  7.8 




The index of financial awareness 
 
The unweighted index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known divided by the number of 
potential assets known. The weighted index uses as weights the inverse of the aggregate fraction of households 
aware of the asset. Statistics are computed using population weights. Values are expressed in percentages. 
 
 
 1995  1998 
 
Unweighted index     
I quartile  42.8  35.3 
Median 64.3  58.8 
III quartile  85.7  82.3 
Average 63.5  58.6 
Standard deviation  27.4  29.9 
    
Weighted index     
I quartile  20.3  23.0 
Median 58.3  46.3 
III quartile  76.7  80.9 
Average 57.8  50.9 






Selected statistics for variables used in the estimation 
 
Indicators of financial awareness, demographic variables, financial assets and real assets are drawn from the 
1995-98 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (15,281 observations in total). Newspaper readership is 
measured by the number of copies sold in each province scaled by the population in the province. The ratio is 
computed considering the 14 newspapers that sell in at least half of the Italian provinces. The index of social 
learning is the number of voluntary organizations per 1000 residents in the province. The Herfindhal index is the 
provincial sum of squared market shares of loans of all banks in each province. Data refer to 1995. Source: 
Centrale dei Rischi, the Italian Central Credit Register managed by the Bank of Italy. Financial and real wealth 
are converted in 1998 prices using the CPI deflator, and expressed in thousand euro. Sample means and standard 
deviations are computed using population weights. 
 
 
Variable  Mean Standard  deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Aware of stocks  0.64  0.48  0  1 
Aware of mutual funds  0.51  0.50  0  1 
Aware of investment accounts  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Aware of corporate bonds  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Index of financial information  0.55  0.30  0  1 
Index of financial information – risky assets only  0.48  0.41  0  1 
Born before 1930  0.27  0.44  0  1 
Born in 1931-45  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Born in 1946-60  0.30  0.46  0  1 
Born after 1960  0.14  0.34  0  1 
High school  0.21  0.40  0  1 
College 0.07  0.25  0  1 
B.A. in economics  0.01  0.11  0  1 
Married 0.70  0.45  0  1 
Male 0.72  0.45  0  1 
Financial wealth  18.5  54.9  0  1674 
Real wealth  119.8  244.0  0  17242 
Disposable income  22.46  18.59  -36.36  508.16 
Long-term bank relation  0.50  0.50  0  1 
Newspapers sales, per capita (%)  5.92  4.10  0.62  18.11 
Index of social learning  0.271  0.134  0.073  0.652 
Herfindhal index  0.15  0.08  0.06  0.50 
Resident in the North  0.47  0.50  0.00  1 





The determinants of awareness: Probit regressions  
 
The regressions pool 1995 and 1998 data. We report marginal effects and robust z statistics in parentheses. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the provincial level.  
  
 
  Stocks  Mutual funds  Investment accounts  Corporate bonds 
 
Born in 1931-45  0.124  0.163  0.124  0.154 
 (10.42)**  (11.76)**  (8.27)**  (10.47)** 
Born in 1946-60  0.180  0.232  0.180  0.212 
 (14.80)**  (15.91)**  (11.47)**  (13.19)** 
Born after 1960  0.205  0.275  0.209  0.256 
 (15.21)**  (13.36)**  (8.48)**  (12.09)** 
High school  0.165  0.237  0.211  0.246 
 (12.79)**  (16.97)**  (14.00)**  (19.83)** 
College 0.169  0.253  0.272  0.251 
 (8.79)**  (11.72)**  (11.35)**  (10.45)** 
B.A. in economics  0.056  0.129  0.208  0.174 
 (0.82)  (2.05)*  (3.83)**  (2.75)** 
Married 0.005  0.001  0.009  -0.001 
 (0.38)  (0.05)  (0.66)  (0.05) 
Male 0.070  0.114  0.094  0.093 
 (3.96)**  (6.41)**  (6.72)**  (6.36)** 
Financial wealth (x1000)  0.518  0.989  0.529  0.735 
 (1.69)  (2.50)*  (2.57)*  (2.10)* 
Real wealth (x1000)  0.147  0.224  0.119  0.222 
 (3.55)**  (4.19)**  (2.78)**  (4.08)** 
Disposable income (x100)  0.557  0.752  0.451  0.751 
 (6.48)**  (9.02)**  (7.73)**  (9.15)** 
Long-term bank relation  0.063  0.084  0.048  0.077 
 (5.24)**  (6.10)**  (4.26)**  (5.41)** 
Newspapers sales  0.102  0.060  0.061  0.094 
 (2.55)*  (1.65)  (1.86)  (2.54)* 
Index of social learning  0.205  0.216  0.194  0.110 
 (2.17)*  (2.28)*  (2.39)*  (1.35) 
Herfindhal index  -0.026  -0.082  -0.160  -0.073 
 (0.16)  (0.56)  (1.04)  (0.51) 
North 0.157  0.196  0.122  0.175 
 (6.07)**  (7.16)**  (4.40)**  (6.79)** 
Dummy for 1998  -0.045  0.057  0.045  0.041 
 (1.80)  (2.51)*  (2.10)*  (1.79) 
 
Proportion aware  0.64  0.51  0.34  0.52 
R square  0.16  0.20  0.15  0.19 
Observations 15281  15281  15281 15281 
 





The determinants of awareness: Tobit regressions for the index of financial awareness 
 
The index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known divided by the number of potential 
assets known, weighted by the inverse of the aggregate fraction of people aware of the asset. The index based on 
risky assets is computed using only stocks, mutual funds, investment accounts, and corporate bonds. We report 
robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the provincial level. 
 
  All assets  Only risky assets 
 
Born in 1931-45  0.107  0.202 
 (13.29)**  (11.73)** 
Born in 1946-60  0.155  0.280 
 (17.36)**  (15.27)** 
Born after 1960  0.179  0.333 
 (13.04)**  (12.45)** 
High school  0.169  0.293 
 (19.19)**  (15.22)** 
College 0.174  0.313 
 (10.88)**  (10.99)** 
B.A. in economics  0.155  0.185 
 (4.97)**  (3.95)** 
Married 0.012  0.019 
 (1.42)  (1.42) 
Male 0.073  0.127 
 (8.50)**  (7.69)** 
Financial wealth (x1,000)  0.124  0.187 
 (1.15)  (1.13) 
Real wealth (x1,000)  0.077  0.127 
 (3.50)**  (3.32)** 
Disposable income (x100)  0.398  0.642 
 (9.33)**  (8.47)** 
Long-term bank relation  0.065  0.107 
 (7.88)**  (7.22)** 
Newspapers sales  0.053  0.099 
 (2.52)*  (2.86)** 
Index of social learning  0.177  0.294 
 (2.93)**  (2.92)** 
Herfindhal index  -0.077  -0.103 
 (0.78)  (0.59) 
North 0.100  0.205 
 (5.76)**  (7.08)** 
Dummy for 1998  0.017  0.052 
 (1.13)  (1.99)* 
Constant 0.111  -0.446 
 (4.22)**  (7.09)** 
 
Average index of financial awareness  0.55  0.48 
Observations 15281  15281 




Awareness and the stockholding puzzle 
 
The first column reports the proportion of households with stocks, mutual funds, investment accounts, and 
corporate bonds. The second column reports the same proportions in the sample of informed investors. The third 
column uses selectivity adjusted estimates for the probability of having stocks, mutual funds, investment 
accounts and corporate bonds in the sample of aware investors to predict the probability of participation in the 
total sample (including aware and unaware investors). The selectivity adjustment takes into account that the 




in the total sample 
Proportion in the sample of 
aware investors 
Proportion if all investors were 
aware (estimated from probit 
with sample selection) 
 
Stocks 5.6 8.7 
 
7.5 





1.8 5.2  3.1 
Corporate bonds 
 
3.8 7.3  5.5 














Number of voluntary association
per 1000 inhabitants
0.429  to  0.652   (23)
0.284  to  0.429   (20)
0.208  to  0.284   (20)
0.178  to  0.208   (14)




Awareness and education 
 
The index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known weighted by the inverse of the 
aggregate fraction of people aware of the asset. The index for risky assets includes stocks, mutual funds, 
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Awareness and cohort 
 
The index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known weighted by the inverse of the 
aggregate fraction of people aware of the asset. The index for risky assets includes stocks, mutual funds, 
investment accounts and corporate bonds. The cohort profiles are estimated by a kernel regression using a 
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Awareness and financial wealth 
 
The index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known weighted by the inverse of the 
aggregate fraction of people aware of the asset. The index for risky assets includes stocks, mutual funds, 
investment accounts and corporate bonds. Financial wealth is expressed in thousand Euro. Data refer to the 
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Awareness and newspapers readership 
 
Newspaper readership is measured by the number of copies sold in each province scaled by the population in the 
province. The ratio is computed considering the 14 newspapers that sell in at least half of the Italian provinces. 
The index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known weighted by the inverse of the 
aggregate fraction of people aware of the asset. The index for risky assets includes stocks, mutual funds, 
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Awareness and social learning 
 
The index of social learning is the number of number of non-profit institutions per 100 inhabitants in the 
province. The index of financial awareness is the sum of the financial assets known weighted by the inverse of 
the aggregate fraction of people aware of the asset. The index for risky assets includes only stocks, mutual 
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Stockholding and participation costs 
 
The figure plots the proportion of stockholders and the associated participation costs for the total sample and the 
sample of informed investors, defined as those who are aware of stocks, mutual funds and managed investment 
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